Abstract Gvozdeva, Hemaspaandra, and Slinko (2011) have introduced three hierarchies for simple games in order to measure the distance of a given simple game to the class of (roughly) weighted voting games. Their third class C α consists of all simple games permitting a weighted representation such that each winning coalition has a weight of at least 1 and each losing coalition a weight of at most α. For a given game the minimal possible value of α is called its critical threshold value. We continue the work on the critical threshold value, initiated by Gvozdeva et al., and contribute some new results on the possible values for a given number of voters as well as some general bounds for restricted subclasses of games. A strong relation beween this concept and the cost of stability, i.e. the minimum amount of external payment to ensure stability in a coalitional game, is uncovered.
Introduction
For a given set N = {1, . . . , n} of n voters a simple game is a function χ : 2 N → {0, 1} which is monotone, i.e. χ(S) ≤ χ(T ) for all S ⊆ T ⊆ N , and fulfills χ(∅) = 0, χ(N ) = 1. Here 2 N denotes the set of all subsets of N . Those subsets are also called coalitions and N is called the grand coalition. By representing the subsets of N by their characteristic vectors in {0, 1} n we can also speak of a (monotone) Boolean function. If χ(S) = 1 then S is called a winning coalition and otherwise a losing coalition. An important subclass is the class of weighted voting games for which there are weights w i for i ∈ N and a quota q > 0 such that the condition i∈S w i ≥ q implies coalition S is winning and the condition i∈S w i < q implies coalition S is losing. One attempt to generalize weighted voting games was the introduction of roughly weighted games, where coalitions S with i∈S w i = q can be either winning or losing independently from each other. 1 As some games being important both for theory and practice are not even roughly weighted, Gvozdeva et al. (2012) have introduced three hierarchies for simple games to measure the distance of a given simple game to the class of (roughly) weighted voting games. In this paper we want to study their third class C α , where the tie-breaking point q is extended to the interval [1, α] for an α ∈ R ≥1 . Given a game χ, the smallest possible value for α is called the critical threshold-value µ(χ) of χ, see the beginning of Section 2. Let c S (n) denote the largest critical threshold-value within the class of simple games χ ∈ S n on n voters. By Spec S (n) := {µ(χ) | χ ∈ S n } we denote the set of possible critical threshold values.
During the program of classification of simple games, see e.g. von Neumann and Morgenstern (2007) , several subclasses have been proposed and analyzed. Although weighted voting games are one of the most studied and most simple forms of simple games, they have the shortcomming of not covering all games. The classes C α resolve this by introducing a parameter α, so that by varying α the classes of games can be made as large as possible. The critical threshold value in some sense measures the complexity of a given game. Another such measure is the dimension of a simple game, see e.g. Taylor and Zwicker (1993) . Here we observe that there is no direct relation between these two concept, i.e. simple games with dimension 1 have a critical threshold value of 1, but simple games with dimension larger than 1 can have arbitrarily large critical threshold values.
Also graphs have been proposed as a suitable representational language for coalitional games. There are a lot of different graph-based games like e.g. shortest path games, connectivity games, minimum cost spanning tree games, and network flow games. The players of a network flow game are the edges in an edge weighted graph, see Granot and Granot (1992) and Kalai and Zemel (1982) . For so called threshold network flow games, see e.g. Bachrach (2011) , a coalition of edges is winning if and only if those edges allow a flow from a given source to a sink which meets or exceeds a given quota or threshold. Here the same phenomenon as for weighted voting games arises, i.e. those graph based weighted games are not fully expressive, but general network flow games are (within the class of stable games). Similarly one can define a hierarchy by requesting a flow of at least 1 for each winning coalition and a flow of at least α for each losing coalition.
The concept of the cost of stability was introduced in Bachrach et al. (2009) . It asks for the minimum amount of external payment given to the members of a coaltion to ensure stability in a coalition game, i.e. in other words, to guarantee a non-empty core. It will turn out that the cost of stability is closely related to the notion of α-roughly weightedness. For network flow games some results on the cost of stability can be found in Resnick et al. (2009) .
Another line of research, that is related with our considerations, looks at the approximability of Boolean functions by linear threshold functions, see Diakonikolas and Servedio (2012) .
In Gvozdeva et al. (2012) the authors have proven the bounds 1 2 · n 2 ≤ c S (n) ≤ n−2 2 and determined the spectrum for n ≤ 6. For odd numbers of voters we slightly improve the lower bound to c S (n) ≥ n 2 4 /n, which is conjectured to be tight. As upper bound we prove c S (n) ≤ n 3 . In order to determine the exact values of c S (n) for small numbers of voters we provide an integer linear programming formulation. This approach is capable to treat cases where exhaustive enumeration is computationally infeasible due to the rapidly increasing number of voting structures. Admittedly, this newly introduced technique, which might be applicable in several other contexts in algorithmic game theory too, is still limited to a rather small number of voters.
From known results on the spectrum of the determinants of binary n × n-matrices we are able to conclude some information on the spectrum of the possible critical threshold values.
The same set of problems can also be studied for subclasses of simple games and we do so for complete simple games, denoted here by C. Here we conjecture that the maximum critical threshold value c C (n) of a complete simple game on n voters is bounded by a constant multiplied by √ n on both sides. A proof could be obtained for the lower bound, and for some special subclasses of complete simple games, also for the upper bound. In general we can show that c C (n) grows slower than any linear function reflecting the valuation that complete simple games are somewhat nearer to weighted voting games than general simple games.
The remaining part of this paper is organized as follows: After this introduction we present the basic definitions and results on linear programs determining the critical threshold value of a simple game or a complete simple game in Section 2. In Section 3 we provide certificates for the critical threshold value. General lower and upper bounds on the maximum possible critical threshold values c S (n) and c C (n) of simple games and complete simple games are the topic of Section 4. In Section 5 we provide an integer linear programming formulation to determine the exact value c S (n) and c C (n). To this end we utilize the dual of the linear program determining the critical threshold value. In Section 6 we give some restrictions on the set of possible critical threshold values and tighten the findings of Gvozdeva et al. (2012) . We end with a conclusion in Section 7.
Preliminaries
In this paper we want to study different classes of voting structures. As abbreviation for the most general class we use the notation B n for the set of Boolean functions f : 2 N → {0, 1} with f (∅) = 0 on n variables 2 . Later on we specialize these sets to monotone Boolean functions with the additional restriction f (N ) = 1, called simple games, and use the notation S n . Even more refined subclasses are the set C n of complete simple games and the set W n of weighted voting games on n voters. These sets are ordered as B n S n C n W n , where the inclusions are strict if n is large enough. In order to state examples in a compact manner we often choose weighted voting games χ, since they can be represented by [q; w 1 , . . . , w n ], where q is a quota and the w i are weights. We have χ(S) = 1 if and only if the sum i∈S w i ≥ q for each subset S ⊆ N . As a shortcut for the sum of weights i∈S w i of a coalition S ⊆ N we will use w(S) in the following.
In this section we state the preliminaries, i.e., we define the mentioned classes of voting structures and provide tailored characterizations of the criticial threshold value within these classes. As a first result we determine the largest possible critical threshold value for Boolean functions in Lemma 1. Since it is closely related, we briefly introduce the concept of the cost of stability for binary voting structures.
Definition 1 A (Boolean) function f : 2 N → {0, 1} with f (∅) = 0 is called α-roughly weighted for an α ∈ R ≥1 if there are weights w 1 , . . . , w n ∈ R fulfilling
We remark that a function f with f (∅) = 1 cannot be α-roughly weighted for any α ∈ R. In contrast to most definitions of roughly weighted games we allow negative weights, in the first run, and consider a wider class than simple games in our initial definition, i.e. Boolean functions with f (∅) = 0. Later on we will focus on subclasses of B n , where we can assume that all weights are non-negative. By T α (instead of C α as in Gvozdeva et al. (2012) ) we denote the class of all α-roughly weighted Boolean functions f with f (∅) = 0. If f ∈ T α but f / ∈ T α for all 1 ≤ α < α we call α the critical threshold value µ(f ) of f . Given f we can determine the critical threshold value using the following linear program:
We consider it convenient to explicitly add the constraint α ≥ 1 in Definition 1, in accordance with Gvozdeva et al. (2012) , and in the linear program (1). Otherwise we would obtain the optimal solution α = 0 for the weighted game [2; 1, 1] ∈ B 2 or the optimal solution α = those values lesser than 1 contain more information, but on the other hand makes notation more complicated. To avoid any misconception we directly require α ≥ 1 (as in Definition 1) to guarantee non-contradicting implications independently from the possible weights of the coalitions. At first we remark that the inequality system (1) has at least one feasible solution given by w i = 1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n and α = n. Next we observe that the critical threshold value is a rational number, as it is the optimum solution of a linear programming problem with rational coefficients, and that we can restrict ourselves to rational weights w i . For a general Boolean function f : 2 N → {0, 1} with f (∅) = 0 negative weights may be necessary to achieve the critical threshold value. An example is given by the function f of three variables whose entire set of coalitions S with f (S) = 1 is given by {{1}, {2}, {1, 2}}. By considering the weights w 1 = w 2 = 1, w 3 = −2 we see that it is 1-roughly weighted. On the other hand we have the inequalities w 1 ≥ 1, w 2 ≥ 1, and w 1 +w 2 +w 3 ≤ α = 1 from which we conclude w 3 ≤ −1. Another way to look at this example is to say that the critical threshold value would be 2 if only non-negative weights are allowed. (Here n = 3 voters are the smallest possibility, i.e. for n ≤ 2 there are non-negative realizations for the critical threshold value.)
A quite natural question is to ask for the largest critical threshold value µ(f ) within the class of all Boolean functions f : 2 N → {0, 1} with f (∅) = 0, which we denote by c B (n), i.e. c B (n) = max{µ(f ) | f ∈ B n }.
Proof By choosing the weights w i = 1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n we have 1 ≤ w(S) ≤ n for all ∅ = S ⊆ N . Thus all functions f : 2 N → {0, 1} with f (∅) = 0 are n-roughly weighted. The maximum c B (n) = n is attained for example at the function with f (N ) = 0 and f ({i}) = 1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Since the singletons {i} are winning, we have w i ≥ 1 for all i ∈ N , so that w(N ) ≥ n while N is a losing coalition.
We would like to remark that if we additionally require f (N ) = 1, then the critical threshold value is at most n − 1, which is tight (the proof of Lemma 1 can be easily adapted).
More interesting subclasses of Boolean functions with f (∅) = 0 are simple games, i.e. monotone Boolean functions with f (∅) = 0 and f (N ) = 1, where f (S) ≤ f (T ) for all S ⊆ T . By T α ∩S n we denote the class of all α-roughly weighted simple games consisting of n voters and by c S (n) := max{µ(f ) | f ∈ S n } the largest critical threshold value within the class of simple games consisting of n voters. For simple games we can restrict ourselves on non-negative weights and can drop some of the inequalities in the linear program (1). (This is not true for general Boolean functions as demonstrated in the previous example.)
Lemma 2 All simple games χ ∈ T α ∩ S n admit a representation in non-negative weights.
Proof Let w i ∈ R, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, be suitable weights. We set w i := max(w i , 0) ∈ R ≥0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. For each winning coalition S ⊆ N we have w (S) ≥ w(S) ≥ 1. Due to the monotonicity property of simple games for each losing coalition T ⊆ N the coalition T := {i ∈ T : w i ≥ 0} is also losing. Thus we have w (T ) ≤ w(T ) ≤ α.
We remark that we have not used χ(∅) = 0 or χ(N ) = 1 so that the statement can be slightly generalized.
Definition 2 Given a simple game χ a coalition S ⊆ N is called a minimal winning coalition if χ(S) = 1 and χ(S ) = 0 for all proper subsets S of S. Similarly a coalition T ⊆ N is called a maximal losing coalition if χ(T ) = 0 and χ(T ) = 1 for all T ⊆ N where T is a proper subset of T . By W we denote the set of minimal winning coalitions and by L the set of maximal losing coalitions.
We would like to remark that a simple game can be completely reconstructed from either the set W of its minimal winning coalitions or the set L of its maximal losing coalitions, i.e. a coalition S ⊆ N is winning if and only if it contains a subset S ∈ W. Similarly, a coalition T ⊆ N is losing if there is a T ∈ L with T ⊆ T .
Proposition 1
The critical threshold value µ(χ) of a simple game χ ∈ S n is given by the optimal target value of the following linear program:
Proof Due to Lemma 2 we can assume w.l.o.g. that w 1 , . . . , w n ≥ 0. With this it suffices to prove that a feasible solution of the stated linear program is also feasible for the linear program (1). Let S ⊆ N be an arbitrary winning coalition, i.e., χ(S) = 1.
Since there exists an S ∈ W with S ⊆ S we have
Similarly for each losing coalition T ⊆ N there exists a T ∈ L with T ⊆ T so that we have
Again we have not used χ(∅) = 0 or χ(N ) = 1 in the proof.
A well studied subclass of simple games (and superclass of weighted voting games) arises from Isbell's desirability relation, see Isbell (1958) : We write i j for two voters i, j ∈ N iff we have χ {i} ∪ S\{j} ≥ χ(S) for all j ∈ S ⊆ N \{i}.
A pair (N, χ) is called a complete simple game if it is a simple game and the binary relation is a total preorder. To factor out symmetry we assume i j for all 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n, i.e. voter i is at least as powerful as voter j, in the following. We abbreviate i j, j i by i j forming equivalence classes of voters N 1 , . . . , N t .
Let us denote |N i | = n i for 1 ≤ i ≤ t. We assume that those equivalence classes are ordered with decreasing influence, i.e. for u ≤ v, i ∈ N u , j ∈ N v we have i j. A coalition in a complete simple game can be described by the numbers a h of voters from equivalence class N h , i.e. by a vector (a 1 , . . . , a t ). Note that the same vector represents n1 a1 n2 a2 . . . nt at coalitions that only differ in equivalent voters. To carry over the concept of minimal winning coalitions and maximal losing coalitions to vectors, we need a suitable partial ordering:
Definition 3 For two integer vectors a = (a 1 , . . . , a t ) and b = (b 1 , . . . , b t ) we write In words, we say that a is smaller than b if a ≺ b and that a and b are incomparable if a b.
With Definition 3 and the representation of coalitions as vectors in N t at hand, we can define:
Definition 4 A vector m := (m 1 , . . . , m t ) in a complete simple game (n 1 , . . . , n t ), χ is a shift-minimal winning vector if m is a winning vector and every vector m ≺ m is losing. Analogously, a vector m is a shift-maximal losing vector if m is a losing vector and every vector m m is winning.
As an example we consider the complete simple game χ ∈ C 4 whose minimal winning coalitions are given by {1, 2}, {1, 3}, {1, 4}, and {2, 3, 4}. The equivalence classes of voters are given by N 1 = {1} and N 2 = {2, 3, 4}. With this the shiftminimal winning vectors are given by (1, 1) and (0, 3). By W we denote the set of shift-minimal winning vectors and by L the set of shift-maximal losing vectors. Each complete simple game can be entirely reconstructed from either W or L.
In Carreras and Freixas (1996) there is a very useful parameterization theorem for complete simple games:
and a matrix
be given, which satisfies the following properties:
for each 1 ≤ j < t there is at least one row-index i such that m i,j > 0, m i,j+1 < n j+1 if t > 1 and m 1,1 > 0 if t = 1, and (iv) m i m i+1 for 1 ≤ i < t (lexicographic order). Then there exists a complete simple game (N, χ) whose equivalence classes of voters have cardinalities as in n and whose shift-minimal winning vectors coincide with the rows of M. (b) Two complete games ( n 1 , M 1 ) and ( n 2 , M 2 ) are isomorphic, i.e., there exists a permutation of the voters so that the games are equal, if and only if n 1 = n 2 and
The rows of M correspond to the shift-minimal winning vectors whose number is denoted by r. The number of equivalence classes of voters is denoted by t. By c C (n) := {max µ(χ) | χ ∈ C n } we denote the largest critical threshold value within the class of complete simple games on n voters. As W ⊆ W and L ⊆ L we want to provide a linear programming formulation for the critical threshold value µ(χ) of a complete simple game χ ∈ C n , similar to Proposition 1, based on shiftminimal winning and shift-maximal losing vectors. At first we show that we can further restrict the set of weights. To this end we call a feasible solution w of the inequality system in Proposition 1, where α is given, a representation (with respect to α).
Lemma 3 All complete simple games χ ∈ T α ∩ C n admit a representation with weights satisfying w 1 ≥ · · · ≥ w n ≥ 0.
Proof As χ ∈ C n ⊆ S n is a simple game, there exists a representation with weights w 1 , . . . , w n ∈ R ≥0 due to Lemma 2. Let (j, h) be the lexicographically smallest pair such that w j < w h and j < h. By τ we denote the transposition (j, h), i.e. the permutation that swaps j and h, and set w i := w τ (i) .
For a winning coalition S with j ∈ S, h / ∈ S we have w(S) ≥ w (S) ≥ 1. If S is a winning coalition with j / ∈ S, h ∈ S then τ (S) is a winning coalition too and we have w(S) = w (τ (S)) ≥ 1. For a losing coalition T with j / ∈ T , h ∈ T we have w(T ) ≤ w (T ) ≤ α. If T is a losing coalition with j ∈ T , h / ∈ T then τ (T ) is a losing coalition too and we have w(T ) = w (τ (T )) ≤ α.
By recursively applying this argument we can construct representing weights fulfilling w 1 ≥ · · · ≥ w n ≥ 0.
We remark that the previous complete simple game with minimal winning coalitions {1, 2}, {1, 3}, {1, 4}, and {2, 3, 4} can be represented as a weighted voting game [4; 3, 2, 1, 1]. Another representation of the same game using equal weights for equivalent voters would be [3; 2, 1, 1, 1].
Lemma 4 All complete simple games χ ∈ T α ∩ C n admit a representation with weights w 1 ≥ · · · ≥ w n ≥ 0 where voters of the same equivalence class have the same weight.
Proof Let w 1 ≥ · · · ≥ w n ≥ 0 be a representation of χ and N 1 , . . . , N t the set of equivalence classes of voters. By 1 ≤ j ≤ t we denote the smallest index such that not all voters in N j have the same weight and define new weights w i := w i for all i ∈ N \N j and w i := h∈N j w h |Nj | , i.e. the arithmetic mean of the previous weights in N j .
By recursively applying this construction we obtain a representation with the desired properties. It remains to show that the new weights w i fulfill the α-conditions. Let S be a winning coalition with k = |S ∩ N j |. By S we denote the union of S\N j and the k lightest voters from N j . Since S is a winning coalition too we have w(S) ≥ w (S ) ≥ 1. Similarly let T be a losing coalition wit k = |T ∩ N j |: By T we denote the union of T \N j and the k heaviest voters from N j . Since T is a losing coalition too we have w(T ) ≤ w (T ) ≤ α.
Lemma 5 The critical threshold value µ(χ) of a complete simple game χ ∈ C n with t equivalence classes of voters is given by the optimal target value of the following linear program:
Proof Due to Lemma 4 we can assume that for the critical threshold value µ(χ) = α there exists a feasible weighting fulfilling the conditions of the stated linear program. It remains to show that w(W ) ≥ 1 and w(L) ≤ α holds for all shift-winning vectors W and all losing vectors L. Therefore we denote by W ∈ W an arbitrary shiftminimal winning vector with W W and by L ∈ L an arbitrary shift-maximal losing vector with L L . The proof is finished by checking
So for complete simple games the number of constraints could be further reduced. In this context we remark that by additionally disregarding the conditions w i ≥ w i+1 from the linear program we would lose the information about the order on equivalence classes. This effect is demonstrated by the following example. Let us consider the complete simple game (n 1 , n 2 ) = (15, 4) with unique shift-minimal winning vector (7, 2). There are two shift-maximal losing vectors: (8, 0) and (6, 4). Choosing the special solution w 1 = 1 14 , w 2 = 1 4 , α = 3 2 would be feasible for
For the coalition (8, 1) we obtain the weight 8w 1 + 1w 2 = 23 28 < 1, so that it should be a losing coalition which is a contradiction to (8, 1) (7, 2). So we have to use the ordering on the weights.
At the beginning of this section we have argued that the condition α ≥ 1 is necessary, since otherwise the optimal target value of the stated linear programming formulations will not coincide with µ(χ) in all cases. On the other hand, if z (χ) denotes the optimal target value of one of the stated LPs, where we have dropped the condition α ≥ 1, then we have
So, in the following we will drop the condition α ≥ 1 whenever it seems beneficial for the ease of a shorter presentation while having the just mentioned exact correspondence in mind.
An important solution concept in cooperative game theory is the core, i.e. the set of all stable imputations, see e.g. Tijs (2011) for an introduction. Since the core can be empty under certain circumstances, the possibility of external payments was considered in order to stabilize the outcome, see Bachrach et al. (2009) . The external party quite naturally is interested in minimizing its expenditures. This leads to the concept of the cost of stability (CoS) of a coalition game. Skipping the relation of CoS with the core, we directly define the cost of stability CoS(f ) of a given Boolean function f with f (∅) = 0 as the solution of the following linear program:
The cost of stability is an upper bound for the critical threshold value:
Lemma 6 For a Boolean function f ∈ B n with f (N ) = 1 we have µ(f ) ≤ 1 + CoS(f ).
Proof Let p 1 , . . . , p n , ∆ be an optimal solution for the above linear program for the cost of stability. If we choose the weights as w i = p i , then we have w i ∈ R and we have w(S) ≥ 1 for all winning coalitions S due to constraint (5). Applying constraint (6) and constraint (4) yields
for all coalitions S ⊆ N . Thus every losing coalition has a weight of at most 1 + CoS(f ).
, where equality is attained for the Boolean function with f (S) = 1 for all S = ∅. With respect to Lemma 1 we then mention the relation
On the other hand we observe that the ratio between CoS(f ) and µ(f ) can be quite large. Theorem 3.3 in Bachrach et al. (2009) states CoS(χ) = n q − 1 for the weighted voting game χ = [q; w, . . . , w], while we have µ(χ) = 1. Setting w = q = 1 we see that the ration can become at least as large as n − 1.
By imposing more structure on the set of feasible games, the upper bound CoS(f ) ≤ n, for f ∈ B n , could be reduced significantly. To this end we introduce further notation:
It is called anonymous if we have f (S) = f (T ) for all coalitions S, T ⊆ N with |S| = |T |, i.e. the outcome only depends on the cardinality of the coalition.
In our context super-additivity means that each pair of winning coalitions has a nonempty intersection, which is also called a proper game. These are the most used voting games for real world institutions.
Certificates
In computer science, more precisely in complexity theory, a certificate is a string that certifies the answer to a membership question (or the optimality of a computed solution). In our context we e.g. want to know whether a given simple game χ ∈ S n is α-roughly weighted. If the answer is yes, we just need to state suitable weights. Given the weights, the answer then can be checked by testing the validity of the inequalities in the linear program of Proposition 1. Since both W and L form antichains, i.e. no element is contained in another, we can conclude from Sperner's theorem that at most 2 n n/2 + n + 1 inequalities have to be checked. But also in the other case, where the answer is no, we would like to have a computational witness that χ is not α-roughly weighted.
For weighted voting games trading transforms, see e.g. Taylor and Zwicker (1999) , can serve as a certificate for non-weightedness. In Gvozdeva and Slinko (2011) this concept has been transfered to roughly weighted games and it was proven that for each non-weighted simple game consisting of n voters there exists a trading transform of length at most (n + 1) · 2 1 2 n log 2 n . Using the concept of duality in linear programming one can easily construct a certificate for the fact that a given voting structure χ is not α -roughly weighed for all α < α, where α ≥ 1 is fixed. To be more precise, we present a certificate for the inequality µ(χ) ≥ α.
The dual of a general linear program min c
The strong duality theorem, see e.g. Vanderbei (2008) , states that if the primal has an optimal solution, x , then the dual also has an optimal solution, y , such that c T x = b T y . As mentioned before, the linear program for the determination of the critical threshold value always has an optimal solution, so that we can apply the strong duality theorem to obtain a certificate.
Considering only a subset of the winning coalitions for the determination of the critical threshold value means removing some constraints of the corresponding linear program. This enlarges the feasible set so that the optimal solution will eventually decrease but not increase. For further utilization we state the resulting lower bound for the critical threshold value of this approach:
Lemma 7 For a given simple game χ ∈ S n let W be a subset of its winning coalitions and L be a subset of its losing coalitions. If (u, v) is a feasible solution of the following linear program with target value α then we have µ(χ) ≥ α .
which is a relaxation of the linear program (1) determining the critical threshold value.
To briefly motivate the underlying ideas we consider an example. Let the simple game χ for 5 voters be defined by its set {1, 2}, {2, 4}, {3, 4}, {2, 5}, {3, 5} of minimal winning coalitions. The set of maximal losing coalitions is given by {1, 3}, {2, 3}, {1, 4, 5} . For this example the linear program of Proposition 1 to determine the critical α (after some easy equivalence transformations) reads as Min α s.t. To obtain a certificate for the fact that χ / ∈ T α for all α < 6 5 , i.e. µ(χ) ≥ 6 5 , we consider the dual problem:
Max y 1 + y 2 + y 3 + y 4 + y 5 + z s.t.
An optimal solution is given by y 1 = y 5 = y 8 = 2 5 , y 2 = y 3 = 1 5 , y 7 = 3 5 , and y 4 = y 6 = z = 0 with target value 6 5 (as expected using the strong duality theorem). In combination with the weak duality theorem, see e.g. Vanderbei (2008) , the stated feasible dual solution (y, z) is a certificate for the fact that the critical threshold value for the simple game χ is larger or equal to 6 5 . In general the optimal solution vector (y, z) has at most n + 1 non-zero entries so that we obtain a very short certificate.
We would like to remark that one can use the values of the dual variables as multipliers for the inequalities in the primal problem to obtain the desired bound on the critical threshold value. In our case multiplying all inequalities with the respective values yields
which is equivalent to α ≥ 6 5 , i.e. a certificate for the fact that χ / ∈ T α ∩ S 5 for α < 6 5 .
Maximal critical threshold values
In Lemma 1 we have shown that the maximum critical threshold value of a Boolean function f : 2 N → {0, 1} with f (∅) = 0 is given by c B (n) = n. If additionally f (N ) = 1 is required the upper bound drops to n − 1 (which is tight). In this section, we want to provide bounds for the maximal critical threshold values for simple games and complete simple games on n voters. By considering a complete simple game with two types of voters we can derive a lower bound of Ω( √ n) for c C (n). Apart from constants, this bound is conjectured to be tight. This will be substantiated by upper bounds of O( √ n) for c C (n) for several special subclasses of complete simple games. For the general case, we can only obtain the result that c C (n) is asymptotically smaller than O(n), which is the asymptotic of the maximum critical threshold value for simple games. Finally, we relate the more sophisticated upper bounds on the cost of stability from Bachrach et al. (2009) . By considering null voters we conclude c S (n) ≤ c S (n+1) and c C (n) ≤ c C (n + 1) for all n ∈ N.
Proposition 2 For n ≥ 4 we have c S (n) ≥ n 2 4 n .
Proof For the even integers we took an example from Gvozdeva et al. (2012) and consider for n = 2k the simple game uniquely defined by the minimal winning coalitions
Then the two coalitions L 1 = {1, 3, . . . , 2k−1} and L 2 = {2, 4, . . . , 2k} are maximal losing coalitions. Our example given above is of this type, i.e. k = 4. We apply Lemma 7 with n . We set
n and check that it is a feasible solution. Since
the proposed lower bound follows.
So we are only able to slightly improve the previously known lower bound for c S (n) if the number of voters is odd. One can easily verify that the given examples have a critical threshold value of n 2 4 n .
Conjecture 1 For n ≥ 4 we have c S (n) = n 2 4 n .
We would like to remark that the simple game defined in the proof of Proposition 2 is very far from being the unique one with µ(χ) = n 2 4 n . For the proof we need that L 1 , L 2 are losing coalitions and that the stated subsets of cardinality two are winning coalitions. We can construct an exponential number of simple games having a critical α of at least n 2 4 n as follows: Let L 1 L 1 and L 2 L 2 such that none of the winning coalitions of size two is contained in L 1 ∪L 2 and |L 1 | , |L 2 | ≥ 1. With this we can specify the coalition L 1 ∪ L 2 either as winning or as losing without violating the other properties. This fact suggests that it might be hard to exactly solve the integer linear program for the determination of c S (n) for larger values of n, see Section 5.
Another concept to measure the deviation of a simple game χ from a weighted voting game is its dimension, i.e. the smallest number k of weighted voting games that χ is given by their intersection, see e.g. Deȋneko and Woeginger (2006) . It is well known that each simple game has a finite dimension (depending on n) Taylor and Zwicker (1993) . Simple games of dimension 1 coincide with weighted voting games having a critical threshold value of 1. The next possible dimension is two, where the critical threshold can be as large as the best known lower bound of n 2 4 n . Thus, there is no direct relation between the dimension of a simple game and its critical threshold value. To construct such examples we split the voters into sets of cardinality at least n 2 , i.e. as uniformly distributed as possible, and assign weight vectors (1, 0) to the elements of one such set and (0, 1) to the elements from the other set. Using a quota vector (1, 1) we obtain a simple game that satisfies the necessary requirements for a critical α of at least n 2 4 n . In other words the dimension of a simple game is somewhat independent from the critical threshold parameter.
Lemma 8 Let χ be a simple game with n voters and µ(χ) = α. If there exists a losing coalition of cardinality k then we have α ≤ n − k.
Proof Let S N be a losing coalition of cardinality k. We use the weights w i = 0 for all i ∈ S and w i = 1 for all i ∈ N \S. Since w(N ) = n − k the weight of each losing coalition is at most n − k and since each winning coalition must contain at least one element from N \S their weight is at least 1.
Lemma 9 Let χ be a simple game with n voters and µ(χ) = α. If the maximum size of a losing coalition is denoted by k we have α ≤ max 1, 
To further improve Corollary 1 some reduction techniques might be useful.
Lemma 10 If a simple game χ on n ≥ 2 voters contains a winning coalition of cardinality one then we have µ(χ) ≤ c S (n − 1).
Proof W.l.o.g. let {n} be a winning coalition. If {1, . . . , n − 1} is a losing coalition then χ is roughly weighted using the weights w 1 = · · · = w n−1 = 0, w n = 1. Otherwise we consider the simple game χ arising from χ by dropping voter n. Let w 1 , . . . , w n−1 be a weighting for χ corresponding to a threshold value of at most c S (n − 1). By choosing w n = 1 we can extend this to a valid weighting for χ since every coalition which contains voter n is a winning coalition.
From now on we consider complete simple games. To provide a lower bound on c C (n) we consider a special subclass of complete simple games, i.e., complete simple games with t = 2 types of voters and a unique shift-minimal winning vector (a, b) (r = 1). So, if a coalition contains at least a voters of the first type and and least a + b members in total, then it is winning, otherwise it is losing.
In the following we will derive conditions on the parameters a and b in order to exclude weighted games, which would lead to a critical threshold value of 1. Since the shift-maximal losing vectors depend on a certain relation between a and b, we have to consider two different cases to state the linear program to determine the critical threshold value.
For a + b − 1 ≤ n 1 (case 1) the shift-maximal losing vectors are given by (a + b − 1, 0), (a − 1, n 2 ) and otherwise (case 2) by (n 1 , a + b − 1 − n 1 ), (a − 1, n 2 ).
Due to condition (a).(iii) in Theorem 1 we have a > 0. For a = n 1 a quota of q = n 1 n 2 + b and weights w 1 = n 2 and w 2 = 1 testify that the game is weighted. So we need only to consider 1 ≤ a ≤ n 1 − 1, 0 ≤ b ≤ n 2 − 1. For b = 0 the games are weighted via quota q = a and weights w 1 = 1, w 2 = 0. For b = 1 the games are weighted via quota q = an 2 + 1 and weights w 1 = n 2 , w 2 = 1. If b = n 2 a quota of q = a + n 2 − 1 + a n1+n2 and weights of w 1 = 1 + 1 n1+n2 , w 2 = 1 show that these games are weighted so that we can assume 2 ≤ b ≤ n 2 − 2 and n ≥ 6.
To compute c C (n, r = 1, t = 2) we have to solve the linear program min α s.t.
for case 1 and min α s.t.
for case 2. We would like to remark that we may also include the constraint α ≥ 1.
Once it is tight we have α = 1, so that we assume α > 1 in the following. The optimal solution of these linear programs is attained at a corner of the corresponding polytope which is the solution of a 3-by-3-equation system arising by combining three of the five inequalities. As notation we use A ⊂ {7, 8, 9, 10, 11} with |A| = 3. (Some of these solutions may be infeasible.) At first we remark that w 1 = w 2 = 0 is infeasible in both cases so that we assume |A ∩ {10, 11}| ≤ 1.
For case 1 the basic solutions, parameterized by sets of tight inequalities, are given by:
an2+b 2 , always feasible, e.g. we have n 2 (b − 1) ≥ b 2 due to b ≤ n 2 − 2 and b ≥ 2 so that α ≥ 1 holds.
a+b , always feasible {7, 9, 11} α = a−1 a < 1, contradiction {8, 9, 10} α = 0 < 1, contradiction {8, 9, 11} α = 0 < 1, contradiction
We always have
an2+b 2 and
an2+b 2 is always the minimum value.
For case 2 the basic solutions are given by:
−a 2 −2ab+a+an1+n1b+an2+b =: α , where we have w 1 ≥ w 2 . α ≥ 1 is equivalent to n 1 n 2 + a − 1 − n 1 ≥ −ab + n 1 b + an 2 which can be simplified to the valid inequality (n 1 − a) 
and α ≤ a−1+n2 a+b is equivalent to
Since in both cases all factors are non-negative the respective inequalities are valid and the minimum possible α-value is given by α .
To answer the question for the maximum possible α in case 1 depending on n we have to solve the following optimization problem
s.t.
where all variables have to be integers. For z ≥ 1, x > y > 0 we have
z−1+y > z+x z+y . Thus the maximum is taken at the minimum value of a which is 1. (a = 1 also yields the weakest constraint a + b − 1 ≤ n 1 .) Since 1 ≤ a ≤ n 1 − 1 is equivalent to n 1 ≥ 2 which is implied by a + b − 1 ≤ n 1 via b ≥ 2 we can drop this constraint.
If a + b − 1 < n 1 then we could decrease n 1 by 1 and increase n 2 by 1 yielding a larger target value. Thus we have a + b − 1 = n 1 which is equivalent to b = n 1 . Using n 1 + n 2 = n yields n 2 = n − b. Inserting then yields the optimization problem
where b, n ∈ N. Relaxing the integrality constraint results in
with optimal value n 5/2 − 2n 2 + n 3/2 2n 2 − 3n 3/2 + n 1/2 ≤ √ n 2 tending to √ n 2 as n approaches infinity. Since the target function is continuous and there is only one inner local maximum, the optimal integer solution is either b = (
2 is fulfilled. Let us denote the first bound by f 1 (n) and the second bound by f 1 (n). In the following table we compare these bounds with the exact value c C (n), determined using the methods from Section 5, and In case 2 we obtain the optimization problem
For a > 1 we can check that decreasing a, n 1 and increasing b, n 2 by 1 does not decrease the target value. Thus we can assume a = 1 in the optimal solution so that the target function simplifies to
. Decreasing b by 1 increases this target function so that either a + b − 1 ≥ n 1 + 1 or b ≥ 2 is tight. In the latter case we would have n 1 ≤ 1, which contradicts 1 = a ≤ n 1 − 1. Thus, we have a + b − 1 = n 1 + 1 in the optimum which is equivalent to b = n 1 + 1. Inserting this and n 2 = n − n 1 yields the target function
having the non-negative optimal solution of b = 1+ √ 1+n 3 −2n n with target value
tending to √ n 2 as n approaches infinity. If the other inequalities are fulfilled, then rounding up or down yields the optimal integral solution (in this case; not in general). In both cases the conditions 2 ≤ b ≤ n 2 − 2, 1 = a ≤ n 1 − 1 are fulfilled for n ≥ 9. We produce a similar table as before: n 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 f 2 (n) 1.1667 1.2308 1.2857 1.3333 1.3750 1.4118 1.4444 1.6250 f 2 (n) 1.0588 1.1667 1.2632 1.3500 1.4286 1.5000 1.5652 1.5484 c C (n) 1.3333 1.4074 1.4667 1.5556 1.6500 1.7344 1.8088 1.8750
So far we do not know any examples of complete simple games with a critical threshold value larger than max 1,
. We will prove Conjecture 2 for some special classes of complete simple games. An important class, attained by many realworld voting systems, is given by the so-called games with consensus, i.e. intersections of a weighted voting game and a symmetric game [q ; 1, . . . , 1], see e.g. Carreras and Freixas (2004); Peleg (1992) . The voting procedure for the council of the European Union based on the Treaty of Nice consists of such a consensus, i.e. at least 14 (or 18, if the proposal was not made by the commission) of the countries must agree. (The two other ingredients are a majority of the voting weights and a majority of the population.) Concerning the distribution of power in the European Union we refer the interested read e.g. to Algaba et al. (2007) .
Lemma 11
The critical threshold value µ(χ) of a complete simple game χ ∈ C n with consensus, given as the intersection of [q; w 1 , . . . , w n ] and [q ; 1, . . . , 1], is at most √ n.
Proof If q ≥ √ n we take weights of
for all voters so that each winning coalition has a weight of at least one and the grand coalition a weight of √ n. In the other cases we take weights wi q for the voters so that each winning coalition has a weight of at least 1. W.l.o.g. we assume w i ≤ q so that the new weights are at most 1. A losing coalition with weight larger than one must fail the criterion of the symmetric game so that it consists of less than √ n members. Thus the weight of each losing coalition is less than √ n.
For large consensus q the critical threshold value is bounded from above by n q , since we can assign weights of 1 q to all voters. We remark that complete simple games ((n 1 , n 2 ), (m 1 , m 2 )) with two equivalence classes of voters and one shiftminimal winning vector are games with consensus and thus have a dimension of at most two 3 . As representation we may use the intersection of [m 1 + m 2 ; 1, . . . , 1] and [m 1 n 2 + m 2 ; n 2 , . . . , n 2 , 1, . . . , 1].
Lemma 12
The critical threshold value µ(χ) of a complete simple game χ ∈ C n with two types of voters is at most √ n + 1.
Proof If χ has only one shift-minimal winning vector we can apply Lemma 11. Since complete simple games with less than four voters are weighted we can assume n ≥ 4. So let m 1 = (a, b) the shift-minimal winning vector with maximal a and m 2 = (c, d) the shift-minimal winning vector with minimal c. Depending on the values of a and c we will provide suitable weights w 1 and w 2 such that each winning coalition has a weight of at least q > 0 and each losing coalition has a weight of at most q · ( √ n + 1), i.e. the proposed weights have to be normalized in order to fit into the framework of a quota q = 1.
If c ≥ 1 we set w 1 = √ n and w 2 = 1. Every shift-minimal winning vector (e, f ) = (a, b) must fulfill c ≤ e ≤ a due to the definition of a, c and e+f ≥ a+b+1 since otherwise (a, b) would not be a shift-minimal winning vector. With this we have
Similarly we obtain
3 Complete simple games with one shift-minimal winning vector and more than two equivalence classes of voters can have dimensions larger than two and as large as Thus it suffices to show that each losing coalition has a weight of at most
Let (g, h) be a losing coalition so that (g, h) (a, b) and (g, h) (c, d). If g ≤ c then h ≤ n 2 ≤ n − a and we have
If g ≥ a then g + h ≤ a + b − 1 since otherwise (g, h) (a, b). With this we have
With this we have
If c = 0 we set w 1 = √ d, where d ≥ a + b + 1 ≥ 2, and w 2 = 1. Let (e, f ) be a winning and (g, h) be a losing coalition. Similarly as before we have e + f ≥ a + b so that
It suffices to show that each losing coalition has a weight of at most
, and we have
We remark that complete simple games with one type of voters are weighted and thus have a critical threshold value of 1.
Lemma 13
The critical threshold value µ(χ) of a complete simple game χ ∈ C n with one shift-minimal winning vector a is at most √ n.
Proof By (n 1 , . . . , n t ) we denote the numbers of voters in the t ≥ 2 equivalence classes of voters and by (a 1 , . . . , a t ) the unique shift-minimal winning vector a.
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ t and have w( a) ≥ 1. Since with these weights we have w(N ) ≤ √ n, every losing coalition has a weight of at most √ n and we have a critical threshold value of at most √ n.
In the remaining cases we have
Due to condition (a)(iii) of Theorem 1 we have a 1 ≥ 1. We set w 1 = 1 and w 2 = · · · = w t = 0 and have w( a) ≥ 1.
For every losing vector
we would have a ≺ l. Thus each losing coalition has a weight of at most √ n and the critical threshold value is bounded from above by √ n in this case.
So we have an upper bound of √ n for the critical threshold value for complete simple games on n voters in several subcases. For the general case of Conjecture 2 we can provide only a first preliminary bound showing that c C (n) asymptotically grows slower than c B (n) so that the maximum critical threshold value in some sense states that complete simple games are nearer to (roughly) weighted voting games than simple games.
Theorem 2 The critical threshold value µ(χ) of a complete simple game χ ∈ C n is in O n·log log n log n .
Proof As weights we choose a slowly decreasing geometric series w i = q i−1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n where q = 1 − log n n·log log n . With this we have 0 ≤ q < 1 and
. Now let W be a winning coalition with the minimum weight and L be a losing coalition with the maximum weight. In the following we will show
. To deduce this bound we will compare the weights of a few subsets of consecutive voters. In order to keep the necessary number of such subsets small we set W := W \(W ∩ L) and L := L\(W ∩ L), i.e. we technically remove common voters. We remark thatW needs not be a winning coalition. Due to the inequality .
At first we consider the case when W is lexicographically larger than L. Let j be the voter with the minimal index (and so the maximal weight) in W . With this we set W = {j}, L = {j + 1, . . . , n} and have
If W is lexicographically smaller than L then let j be an index with | W ∩ {1, . . . , j}
|. With this we set L := {1, . . . , k 2 } ∪ {j + 1, . . . , n} and W :=
To finish the proof we show q −n ∈ O n·log log n log n
. From
Thus for large enough n we have log q −n ≤ n · − log 1 − log n n · log log n ≤ n · 2 log n n · log log n ≤ 2 log n log log n and 2 log n log log n ≤ log n − log log n + log log log n = log n·log log n log n .
In the context of the conjectured upper bound of O( √ n) for c C (n) we find it interesting to mention that the cost of stability CoS(f ) of any super-additive, see Definition 5, Boolean game f ∈ B n is upper bounded by √ n − 1, see Bachrach et al. (2009) . If f is additionally anonymous, then the authors have proven the tighter bound CoS(f ) ≤ 2. This coincides with the situation for the critical threshold value. Here we may consider the super-additive anonymous Boolean game f ∈ B n , where coalitions of size n+1 2 are winning and the grand coalition N is losing.
An integer linear programming approach to determine the maximal critical threshold value
In principle it is possible to determine the maximal critical threshold value c S (n) for a given integer n by simply solving the stated linear program from Proposition 1 for all simple games χ ∈ S n . Since for n ≤ 8 there are 1, 4, 18, 166, 7 579, 7 828 352, 2 414 682 040 996, and 56 130 437 228 687 557 907 786 simple games, an exhaustive search seems to be hopeless even for moderate n (of course theoretical results may help to reduce the number of simple games which need to be checked). For n = 9 only the lower bound 10 42 is known. So alternatively we will formulate c S (n) as the solution of an optimization problem in the following to avoid exhaustive enumeration. It is possible to describe the set of monotone Boolean functions as integer points of a polyhedron, see e.g. Kurz (2012b) : For each subset S ⊆ N we introduce a binary variable x S and use the constraints x ∅ = 0, x N = 1, and x S\{i} ≤ x S for all ∅ = S ⊆ N , i ∈ S to model a simple game via χ(S) = x S . (We have to remark that this ILP formulation is very symmetric.) In this framework it is very easy to add additional restrictions. Methods how to restrict the underlying games to complete simple games or weighted voting games are outlined in Kurz (2012b) . The restriction to e.g. proper simple games can be modeled via x S + x N \S ≤ 1 for all S ⊆ N . Similarly, strong simple games can be modeled by using the constraints x S + x N \S ≥ 1 for all S ⊆ N .
So the problem of determining c S (n) can be stated as the following optimization problem: Maximize over all simple games with n voters the minimum α of the linear program (1). Since this is a two-level optimization problem, we have to reformulate the problem in order to apply integer linear programing techniques.
In order to determine c S (n) we cannot maximize α directly since we have χ ∈ T λα ∩ S n for all λ ≥ 1 if χ ∈ T α ∩ S n . To specify the minimum value α for a given simple game χ we can also maximize its corresponding dual linear program of (1) whose optimal solution is α.
If we drop the restriction α ≥ 1 and assume w i ≥ 0, the dual program for a simple game χ is given by
where W denotes the set of winning coalitions and L denotes the set of losing coalitions. As outlined in Section 2 the optimal target value S∈W u S might take values smaller than 1 (but being non-negative) which correspond to a critical threshold value of µ(χ) = 1.
The next step is to replace the externally given sets W and L by variables such that the possible sets correspond to simple games. Using our previously defined binary variables x S this is rather easy:
The problem is a quadratically constrained quadratic program (QCQP) with binary variables or more generally a mixed-integer quadratically constrained program (MIQCP). There are solvers, like ILOG CPLEX, that can deal with these problems effectively whenever the target function and the constraints are convex. Unfortunately, neither our target function nor the feasibility set is convex. Thus in order to solve this optimization problem directly, we have to utilize a solver that can deal with non-convex mixed-integer quadratically constrained programs like SCIP, see e.g. Berthold et al. (2011a,b) 4 . In principle this works but problems become computationally infeasible very quickly. By disabling preprocessing we can force SCIP to use general MIQCP-techniques. Solving the problem Boolean functions with f (∅) = 0 and n = 3 took 0.07 seconds and 43 b&b-nodes, for n = 4 it took 8.45 seconds and 15770 b&b-nodes, and for n = 5 we have aborted the solution process after 265 minutes and 1.6 · 10 6 nodes, where more than 33 GB of memory was necessary. By enabling preprocessing SCIP is able to automatically find a reformulation as a binary linear program. This way SCIP can solve the instance for n = 8 in 2.9 seconds in the root node but will take more than 211 minutes, 373000 nodes, and 1.8 GB of memory to solve the instance for n = 9.
Since often binary linear programs are easier to solve than binary quadratic problems, we want to reformulate our binary quadratic optimization problem into a binary linear one. There are several papers dealing with reformulations of MIQCPs into easier problems, see e.g. Letchford and Galli (2011) . Here we want to present a custom-tailored approach based on some techniques that are quite standard in the mixed integer linear programing community (but we will outline them nevertheless). Using this formulation, SCIP needed only 18.72 seconds to solve the instance for n = 15 without applying branch&bound. We would like to remark that CPLEX was even faster using only 5.61 seconds of computation time.
A quite general technique to get rid of logical implications are so called Big-M constraints, see e.g. Koch (2004) . To explain the underlying concept we consider a binary variable x ∈ {0, 1}, a real-valued variable y, and a conditional inequality y ≤ c for a constant c, which only needs to be satisfied if x = 1. The idea is to use this inequality, but to modify its right-hand side with a constant times (1 − x):
For x = 1 this inequality is equivalent to the desired conditional inequality. Otherwise the new inequality is equivalent to y ≤ c + M , which is satisfied if M is large enough. Given a known upper bound y ≤ u, where possibly u c, it suffices to choose M = u − c. Now we want to apply this technique in a more sophisticated way, to remove the non-linear term x S · u S , where x S ∈ {0, 1} and u S ∈ [0, β]. We replace the term x S · u S by the variable z ≥ 0 using the constraints z ≤ βx S , z ≤ u S , and z ≥ u S − β (1 − x S ). If x S = 1 these inequalities state that z = x S · u S = u S must hold and for x S = 0 they imply z = x S · u S = 0. Thus one extra variable and three additional inequalities are necessary for each term of the form x S · u S or x S · v S . The LP relaxation gets worser with increasing β, the so-called big-M constant. Of course in general it may be hard to come up with a concrete bound β. In our case it is not too hard to prove u S , v S ≤ 1: If x T = 0 then from v S ≥ 0 for all S ⊆ N and
Otherwise v T does not occur anywhere in the optimization problem and v T ≤ 1 is a valid inequality. Similarly if x T = 0 then u T does not appear anywhere and on the other hand for x T = 1 we have
Due to the special structure of our problem we can reformulate our problem without additional variables and fewer additional constraints. The main idea is to use the term u S instead of x S · u S and to ensure that we have u S = 0 for x S = 0. Similarly we replace the products (1 − x S ) · v S by v S and ensure that we have v S = 0 if
Inequalities (21) and (22) The optimum target value of this ILP is the desired value c S (n) for each integer n. We have to remark that our modeling of the set of simple games is highly symmetric and each solution comes with at least n! isomorphic solutions which is a very bad feature for an ILP model. With the stated ILP model we were able to computationally prove Conjecture 1 for n ≤ 9 taking less than 37 seconds for n = 7, less than 279 seconds for n = 8 but already 66224 seconds and 161898779 branch&bound nodes for n = 9. For n = 10 we have computationally obtained the bounds We would like to remark that we can enhance this ILP formulation a bit. Since we have c S (n + 1) ≥ c S (n) we may apply Lemma 10 and require x {i} = 0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, where n ≥ 2.
If we replace conditions (20) by those for complete simple games we can determine the exact values c C (n) for n ≤ 16: c C (1) = c C (2) = c C (3) = c C (4) = c C (5) = c C (6) = 1, c C (7) = 
The spectrum of critical threshold values
In the sections 4 and 5 we have considered the maximum critical threshold value for several classes of games. By Spec S (n) we denote the entire set of possible critical threshold values of simple games on n voters. Similarly we define Spec B (n) as the set of possible critical threshold values for Boolean functions f : 2 N → {0, 1} with f (∅) = 0 and Spec C (n) as the set of possible critical threshold values for complete simple games on n voters. In this section we will provide a superset for the spectrum using known information of the set of possible determinants of 0-1 matrices. In order to compute the exact sets for small values of n we modify the presented integer linear programming approach for the determination of the maximum critical threshold value to that end.
By considering null voters we conclude Spec S (n) ⊆ Spec S (n+1), Spec B (n) ⊆ Spec B (n + 1), and Spec C (n) ⊆ Spec C (n + 1). Due to the inclusion of the classes of games we obviously have
Principally it is possible to determine the sets Spec S (n) for small numbers of voters by exhaustive enumeration of all simple games. As mentioned in the previous section this approach is very limited due to the quickly increasing number of simple games. In Gvozdeva et al. (2012) the authors have determined Spec S (n) for all n ≤ 6 by some theoretical reductions and exhaustive enumeration on the restricted set of possible games.
In this section we want to develop an approach based on integer linear programming to determine the spectrum and to utilize results on Hadamard's maximum determinant problem to obtain a superset of the spectrum. For the latter let us consider the linear program (1) determining the critical threshold value of a Boolean function with f (∅) = 0. Each element of the spectrum Spec B (n) appears as the optimal so-lution of this linear program for a certain Boolean function f . If inequality α ≥ 1 is attained with equality in the optimal solution, the critical threshold value is 1. So we may drop this inequality and consider only those functions f where the linear program (1) without the inequality α ≥ 1 has an optimal solution, which is then attained in a corner. Thus there are subsets W 1 , . . . , W k ⊆ N , where 0 ≤ k ≤ n + 1, with j∈Wi w j = 1 and n + 1 − k subsets L 1 , . . . , L n+1−k ⊆ N with −α + j∈Li w j = 0 such that the entire linear equation system has a unique solution. (We remark that k = 0 and k = n + 1 lead to infeasible solutions.)
Writing this equation system in matrix notation A · (w 1 , . . . , w n , α) T = b we can use Cramer's rule to state
where A α arises from A by replacing the rightmost column by b. Since A α is a 0/1-matrix we can use an improved version of Hadamard's bound and have Brenner and Cummings (1972) . If we multiply the rightmost column of A by −1, which changes the determinant by a factor of (−1) n+1 then it becomes a 0/1-matrix too and we conclude
For specific n the uppers bounds on the determinant of 0/1-matrices can be improved. The exact values for the maximum determinant of a n × n binary matrix for n ≤ 17 are given by 1, 1, 2, 3, 5, 9, 32, 56, 144, 320, 1458, 3645, 9477, 25515, 131072, 327680, 1114112 , see e.g. sequence A003432 in the on-line encyclopedia of integer sequences and the references therein.
Another restriction on the possible critical threshold values is obviously given by the maximum values, i.e. µ(χ) ≤ c B (n) (or µ(χ) ≤ c S (n) for simple games, µ(χ) ≤ c C (n) for complete simple games. Further restrictions come from the possible spectrum of determinants of binary matrices. For binary n × n-matrices all determinants between zero and the maximal value can be attained. For n ≥ 7 gaps occur, see e.g. Craigen (1990) . The spectrum of the determinants of binary 7 × 7-matrices was determined in Metropolis (1971) to be {1, . . . , 18} ∪ {20, 24, 32}. Using this more detailed information we can conclude that the denominator q of the critical threshold value of a Boolean function with f (∅) = 0 on 6 voters is at most 17. Thus we are able to compute a finite superset Λ(n) of Spec B (n) for each number n of voters.
Our next aim is to provide an ILP formulation in order to determine the entire spectrum for simple games and complete simple games on n voters. Therefore, we consider the linear program (1) for the determination of the critical threshold value. Dropping the constraint α ≥ 1 and assuming w i ≥ 0 we abbreviate the emerging linear program by min c T x, Ax ≥ b, x ≥ 0. If its optimal value is at least 1 then it coincides with the critical threshold value. Otherwise the game is weighted. By the strong duality theorem its dual max b T y A T y ≤ c, y ≥ 0 has the same optimal solution if both are feasible. This is indeed the case taking the dual solution y = 0 and primal weights of 1 with an α of n. Thus we can read of the critical threshold value as c T x from each feasible solution of the inequality system Ax ≥ b, A T y ≤ c, c T x = b T y, x, y ≥ 0. As done in Section 5 we model the underlying simple game by binary variables x S for the subsets S ⊆ N and use Big-M constraints:
w n ≥ 0 (35)
Inequalities (28)-(31) model the simple games. The primal program to determine the critical threshold value is given as inequalities (32) (33) states that the weight of each winning coalition is at least 1 and that the weight of each losing coalition is at least zero, which is a valid inequality. Similarly Inequality (34) is fulfilled for x S = 1 and translates to w(S) ≤ α for each losing coalition S. The formerly used dual linear program is stated in inequalities (36)-(41). Finally the coupling of the primal and the dual target value is enforced in Inequality (42).
roughly weighted, we have Spec C (n) = {1} for n ≤ 6. For n = 7 we have determined min Spec C (7)\{1} = 39 38 .
Conclusion
In this paper we have considered the critical threshold values for several subclasses of binary voting structures. For Boolean games an exact upper bound of µ B (n) = n could be determined. The set of achievable values is strongly related to the spectrum of determinants of binary matrices, so that Hadamard's bound comes into play. We have strengthened the lower and upper bound on the maximum critical threshold value of a simple game on n voters to n 2 4 /n ≤ c S (n) ≤ n 3 . It remains to prove (or to disprove) the conjecture that the lower bound is tight. By introducing an integer linear programming approach to determine the maximum critical threshold value we could algorithmically verify this conjecture for all n ≤ 9. On the one hand, this seems to be a rather small number. On the other hand, regarding the question of the number of simple games, not much more than a lower bound of 10 42 is known. Since the number of simple games grows doubly exponential, no huge improvements can be expected from an algorithmic point of view.
For complete simple games the problem to determine c C (n) is considerably harder. The large gap between the stated upper bound c1n log log n log n and lower bound c 2 √ n deserves to be closed or at least to be narrowed. In order to facilitate the conjectured asymptotics of Θ( √ n) we have provided a class of examples achieving this bound and have proven the respective upper bounds for several subclasses of complete simple games.
So far we have no structural insights on those complete simple games which achieve c C (n) as their critical threshold value. The given integer linear programming formulation for c C (n) made it possible to determine exact values for numbers of voters where even the number of complete simple games is not known. To be more precise, there are 284 432 730 174 complete simple games for nine voters, see e.g. Kurz (2012a) or Freixas and Molinero (2010) , while exact numbers are unknown for n ≥ 10. The fact that the exact numbers for the critical threshold values c C (n) for complete simple games are known up to n = 16, indicates the great potential of our introduced algorithmic approach. Similar integer linear programming formulations can possibly be developed for other problems on extremal voting schemes. Applications to related concepts like, e.g., the nucleolus or the cost of stability seem to be promising.
In this paper we leave the question for the complexity to determine the criticial threshold value within a given class of games open, but expect it to be in NP in general.
Concerning the discriminability of the hierarchy of α-roughly weighted simple games, it would be nice to prove (if true) that there is a complete simple game χ with critical threshold value µ(χ) = p q for all integers p ≥ q. Some first experiments let us conjecture that there even is a complete simple game with two types of voters and one shift-minimal winning vector.
As usual, the relation to other solution concepts from the game theory literature to the critical threshold value should be studied. We have started this task by considering the cost of stability. Is turns out that the critical threshold value is upper bounded by the cost of stability. From that we could deduce an upper bound of √ n for superadditive games. For Boolean games the asymptotic extremal values coincide, while they can differ to a large extend for concrete games.
The maximum critical threshold value can discriminate between the classes of simple games, complete simple games, and weighted voting games, while the cost of stability can not. The concept of a dimension of a simple game is not directly related to the critical threshold value.
The concept of α-weightedness seems very interesting. More research should be done in that direction. A quite natural idea is to transfer the concept to ternary voting games, see e.g. Felsenthal and Machover (1997) and Freixas and Zwicker (2003) , or graph based games like e.g. network flow games. Also effectivity functions, see e.g. Storcken (1997) , might be candidates for a generalization of the basic concept. Last but not least, there are two additional hierarchies of simple games described in Gvozdeva et al. (2012) which deserve to be analyzed in more detail.
